A log about yourself isn't evidence.

When someone disputes your record, they ask two questions.

On the first question, Tersign is a party to none of the customer transactions it records: it hosts no agent, relays no request and moves no payment for either side, and counter-signs what a party submits without seeing the act. No customer owns Tersign or holds its signing key. That is a fact about us, not about a signature, so check it as you would any counterparty's, outside the record. On the second, every record Tersign signs can be checked with our code or anyone's. The signature covers what reached the ledger and when, not what happened outside it. Two things still rest on us: that the address at /v1/ledger is ours, and that we keep one history per chain. Records never submitted are outside every check.

Four properties a reader checks.

Each is written as a disqualification, what a record must not be read as. The open conformance suite, which anyone can run, tests each with two-sided vectors as far as bytes can show it. Who controls a key, and whether anyone saw the act, are not in the bytes: no vector tests them, and an accepting vector does not establish them.

• Independence: a matter of control, not of a signature.

  A record composed and signed only by the payer, the payee or their operators shows what those parties assert, not that an outside party would concur, and a second key or process run by the same operator does not change that. Tersign counter-signs as a party to neither side of a customer record. It is on both sides only of its own records: the genesis demo; test records, which no published figure counts; and the prober's daily census commitments, which no organic figure counts and whose only outside parties are the time anchors that date them.

• Completeness: a record removed later shows.

  A sequence the issuer numbers itself shows order, never that nothing was taken out: delete a record and renumber, and it still looks clean. A sequence numbered by the counter-signer, under an anchored commitment, makes a record removed later visible to anyone who holds the chain. Records never submitted are outside it.

• Existence in time: the clock is not the keeper's to move.

  A signature shows integrity, not when a record came into being. Tersign anchors chain commitments with independent time anchors, so "existed no later than" the anchor's time is checkable with public tools. The anchor log

• Phase separation: funding is not delivery is not settlement.

  A record of one economic phase says nothing about a later one. A funding receipt is not proof of delivery, and a delivery attestation is not proof of settlement. The conformance suite rejects a record of one phase presented as another.

The harder task is to demonstrate, not to assert.

Some evidence can only be gathered at the time.

Tersign's prober observes x402 endpoints listed for public discovery, as a party to none of their transactions, and keeps each endpoint's observations as its own hash chain. Observations cannot be made after the fact: whoever starts watching later sees the endpoints as they are then, not what they served before.

Its counts are public at https://prober.tersign.ai/v1/prober/stats and live on the home page. Each observation records what an endpoint served to the prober's own request; it shows nothing about that endpoint's transactions with anyone else.

Independent reproductions.

Any venue or auditor that reproduces a check of our records, and meets the definition above, may be listed here, in its own words, with its permission.

People's Court is run by a separate company: no payment passed either way, neither holds any interest in or control over the other, and no one controls both.